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The well publicized struggle by Mobil Corporation to acquire
Marathon Oil Company focused public attention on a corporate merger device that has become popular in recent years. That device is the
"lock-up," a term used to describe an agreement which attempts to
guarantee a merger between two corporations by making it unattractive for a third company to defeat the merger through competitive
bidding for the target company.' Originally, a lock-up referred to
the purchase by the acquiring company of a large block of shares from
a major shareholder of the target company prior to the making of a
tender offer.2 Lately, however, target companies have developed
variations of the lock-up through its use in arranging "white knight"
3
takeovers and negotiated mergers.

' Nathan, Lock-Ups and Leg-Ups: The Searchfor Security in the Acquisition Market Place,

in CORPORATE LAW AND

PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SEIRES

16, 15, 21 (1981) (No. 373); Kramer,

The Formulated Lock-Up: New Technique Emerges in Takeover Arena, Nat'l. L.J., Aug. 3,
1981, at 19, col. 3 (special section).
2 Nathan, supra note 1, at 21; Kramer, supra note 1, at 19, col. 3. A tender offer is an offer
made by a would-be acquiror directly to the target company's shareholders to purchase their
shares, thereby gaining control of the company. See generally Merrifield, Cash Tender Offers
and Registered Exchange Offers, Techniques of Mergers and Acquisitions, inCORPORATE LAW
AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SliuEs 213 (1974) (No. 152).
Nathan, supra note 1, at 59-60, 75-87. A white knight is a third company with whom the
target company arranges a "friendly" merger in order to foil the attempted takeover. It is a
common defensive technique in a tender offer situation. Comment, Antitakeover Maneuvers:
Developments in Defense Tactics and Target Actions for Injunctive Relief, 35 Sw. L.J. 617, 629
(1981). A lock-up seeks to ensure the white knight's success, thus preventing the undesirable
tender offer. Negotiated mergers involve a business decision between two companies to merge. A
lock-up in this situation seeks to ensure completion of that agreement by preventing a subsequent
takeover by a third company.
One variation of the lock-up is illustrated by the agreement between Buffalo Forge Company and Ogden Corporation. In that agreement, Buffalo Forge sought to defeat AmpcoPittsburg Corporation's attempted takeover by granting its white knight, Ogden, an option to
purchase a block of Buffalo Forge treasury shares. Ogden's Novel Bid for Buffalo Forge, Bus.
Wk., March 2, 1981, at 29. The use of treasury shares acts as a deterrent by increasing the total
number of outstanding shares, thereby increasing the number of shares the original tender
offeror would need to purchase in order to acquire a controlling interest. The use of treasury
shares enables a company's board of directors to offer stock while avoiding federal laws that
require shareholder approval prior to disposal. Id. at 30. Ampo-Pittsburg ultimately succeeded
in acquiring Buffalo Forge by raising its offer. An Expensive Victory for Ampco-Pittsburg, id.,
March 23, 1981, at 45.
Another variation is the negotiated acquisition agreement involving options to purchase
newly issued shares of common stock. This variation is exemplified by the arrangements between
Reliance Universal Inc. and Tyler Corp., as well as Kearny-National Inc. and Wabash Inc.
Kramer, .supranote 1, at 21, col. 2-3.
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The growth in the popularity of the lock-up technique is largely
due to the increased cost of engaging in a bidding war and of defend-

ing against undesirable takeovers. 4 Companies are unwilling to act as
white knights or to negotiate for a merger with a target, or potential
target of another company without reasonable assurances of success. 5
A lock-up actively encourages mergers by providing such assurances.
The use of a lock-up also may result in higher per share prices to the
benefit of the acquired company's shareholders. Although it can be
argued that its use results in lower prices by eliminating competition,
including a lock-up in a tender offer or merger arrangement is often
7
the only way of obtaining a competitive bid.
The lock-up which was the subject of the decision in Mobil Corp.
v. Marathon Oil Co.,8 involved an attempt to defeat the takeover of
Marathon Oil Company (Marathon) by Mobil Corporation (Mobil)
through the grant of options to U.S. Steel Corporation (U.S. Steel) for
the purchase of unissued common stock and Marathon's primary asset. 9 Mobil's attempt to prevent Marathon's use of purchase options
in the agreement with its white knight resulted in the first major court

decision concerning the use of the lock-up.
On October 30, 1982, Mobil Corporation, the second largest
petroleum company in the United States,' 0 made a tender offer to the
shareholders of Marathon Oil Company" which is ranked seventeenth in the same industry.' 2 Mobil sought to purchase forty million
The lock-up offered by Pullman Inc. to Wheelabrator-Frye Inc. as an incentive to bid
against McDermott Inc. consisted of options to purchase both common stock and Pullman's
engineering and construction business. Nathan, supra note 1, at 75-76.
In addition, a lock-up can take the form of an agreement by the target company to pay the
legal expenses of the desired acquiror or a promise by the target to the desired acquiror not to
solicit competing bids. Blustein & Rotbart, Court Rulings on U.S. Steel and Mobil May Change
Merger Came, Slow Oil Takeovers, Wall St. J., Jan. 7, 1982, at 23, col. 6; see Nathan, supra
note 1, at 80-87. Whatever the form, however, the ultimate goal of the lock-up is to insure the
success of the desired merger.
4 Blustein, More Companies Use "The Lock-up" to Ward Off Unfriendly Takeovers. Wall
St. J., Jan. 28, 1981, at 31, col. 4. The cost of defensive techniques is augmented by the fact that
they are generally unsuccessful. In approximately one such situation out of five does a target
company successfully defend against an unwanted takeover. See infra note 74 and accompanying
text.
5 Blustein, supra note 4 at 31, col. 4.
6 See infra text accompanying notes 63-64.
7 Nathan, supra note 1, at 72.
a 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981).
9 Id. at 367.
10 Marathon Oil Co. v. Mobil Corp., 669 F.2d 378, 380 (6th Cir. 1981). "Mobil has sales of
$63.7 billion and net income of $3.27 billion." Id.
" 669 F.2d at 367.
12 Paul & Nag, Mobil Offer Fails to Lure Enough Marathon Shares, Wall St. J., Nov. 24,
1981, at 56, col. 1. Marathon has sales of $8 billion and net income of $379 million. Marathon
Oil Co. v. Mobil Corp., 669 F.2d 378, 380 (6th Cir. 1981).
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shares of Marathon's outstanding common stock for eighty-five dollars
per share giving Mobil ownership of sixty-seven percent of Marathon's
total outstanding common stock.1 3 Upon receiving a minimum of
thirty million shares, fifty-one percent of the total outstanding, Mobil
planned to effect a merger by exchanging thirty year debentures
valued at eighty-five dollars for each of the remaining Marathon
shares. "

In meeting to discuss Mobil's tender offer, the Marathon directors
determined that the bid was undesirable largely because they believed
it to be underpriced and because of Mobil's apparent intention to
increase its resources by selling Marathon upon acquisition, retaining
only Marathon's interest in a West Texas Oilfield.15 Attempting to
block Mobil's bid, Marathon sought to enjoin Mobil's purchase of
shares tendered by Marathon shareholders on grounds that the acquisition would violate federal antitrust laws. 6 Marathon also sought
13669 F.2d at 367.
11 Id.; Wall St. J., Nov. 24, 1981, at 56, col. 1. Such a two-step process whereby an offeror
merges with the target company after obtaining a large percentage of the targets outstanding
shares through the tender offer is a familiar tender offer tactic. Note, Corporate Directors'
Liability for Resisting a Tender Offer: Proposed Substantive and Procedural Modifications of
Existing State FiduciaryStandards, 32 VAND. L. REv. 575, 578 n.17 (1979).
13 Brief for Appellee at 6-8, Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981)
[hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellee]. Acquisition of Marathon would increase Mobil's domestic gas and oil reserves by 75%. Mobil's own domestic drilling has been relatively unsuccessful,
forcing the company to rely on imported foreign oil subject to politically motivated price swings.
N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1981, at Al, col. 4.
11Marathon Oil Co. v. Mobil Corp., 669 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1981). Marathon alleged
violations of section 7 of the Clayton Act, which provides in part:
No person engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce shall acquire,
directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no
person subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the
whole or any part of the assets of another person engaged also in commerce or in any
activity affecting commerce, where in any line of commerce or in any activity
affecting commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may
be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
15 U.S.C. § 181 (1976). Marathon's injunction was granted by Judge Manos of the District Court
for the Northern District of Ohio and was upheld by the Court of Appeals for Sixth Circuit in a
case decided concurrently with this Note's subject case. Marathon Oil Co. v. Mobil Corp., 669
F.2d 378, 383-84(6th Cir. 1981). It was found that a Mobil-Marathon combination would result
in market shares for motor gasoline of between 17 and 50% in the Middle West and of 10% in
the nation as a whole. Id. at 380. Such large market shares in an industry as large as the oil
industry where consumer demand is relatively unaffected by price, where high capital requirements prevent new firms from freely entering the market, and where the individual companies
have developed strong, interdependent relationships, are significantly likely to result in lessened
competition in those markets. Id. at 383. Thus, the court concluded that there was a substantial
likelihood that the proposed takeover would violate the Clayton Act and granted an injunction.

Id.
This opinion provided the basis for Judge Merritt's dissent in Mobil. Judge Merritt decided
that "Mobil's ability to raise and maintain a Williams Act challenge to the option arrangement
necessarily rests on the assumption that Mobil can, in fact, make a tender offer." 669 F.2d at 378
(Merritt, J.,dissenting). Because that court had just enjoined Mobil from pursuing its tender
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competing bids from potential white knights.17 After examining proposals from several companies, Marathon directors accepted the one
18
presented by U.S. Steel.
U.S. Steel offered to pay Marathon shareholders "$125 a share for
30 million shares."' 9 If that purchase succeeded, Marathon would
then merge with a U.S. Steel subsidiary by exchanging $100 of 12.5 %
twelve year U.S. Steel notes for each of the remaining Marathon
shares.2 0 At the insistence of U.S. Steel, the offer and subsequent
merger were made conditional upon Marathon's granting U.S. Steel
two options.2 ' The first was an option to purchase up to ten million
unissued common shares in Marathon's treasury at $90 a share.2 2 The
second was an option to purchase Marathon's forty-eight percent
interest in the Yates Oilfield for $2.8 billion should Mobil or another
23
company succeed in acquiring Marathon.

Realizing that the U.S. Steel offer and agreement would serve
both to defeat the original offer as well as to make a second offer
impractical, Mobil filed for injunctive relief in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. 24 Mobil alleged that
the granting of the two options constituted a manipulative device
offer to Marathon's shareholders, the issues in its suit against Marathon were moot. Id. The
majority, however, believed that the possibility still existed that Mobil could prevail in subsequent litigation concerning the antitrust issue and, therefore, considered Mobil's request for an
injunction against Marathon. Id. at 373.
17 669 F.2d at 367.
18 Id. Marathon received oral offers from Gulf Oil Corporation and Allied Corporation.
Allied was willing to pay $120 per share for all of Marathon's outstanding common stock. As part
of the transaction, Allied requested an option to purchase the Yates Oilfield for $3 billion.
Marathon rejected the proposal because of Allied's requirement that Marathon finance the
tender offer by purchasing oil property owned by Allied for $3 billion. Brief for Appellant at 6,
Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Brief for
Appellant].
Gulf offered to pay between $130 and $140 per share for 50% of Marathon's shares if
Marathon agreed to grant it an option to purchase a large block of unissued common stock and
an option to purchase Marathon's interest in the Yates Oilfield. Gulf also agreed to withdraw its
offer in the event that Marathon succeeded in its antitrust suit against Mobil, provided it would
then be permitted to purchase 10% of Marathon's interest in the Yates Oilfield for $280 million.
Gulf's offer was still tentative at the time of U.S. Steel's firm offer. Brief for Appellee, supra note
15, at 10.
,9 669 F.2d at 367.

20 Id.; Chavcz, Big Steel's Moves to Diversijy, N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1981, at D4, col. 1.
With interest rates at the time at roughly 15%, the then current value of the U.S. Steel notes was
$86. The overall value of the U.S. Steel offer, therefore, was $105 per share. Id.
11669 F.2d at 367.
22 Id.
23 Id. The West Texas Oilfield is considered to be Marathon's principal asset. For a discussion
of the field's production potential and approximate value, see Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co.,
No. 81-1402, slip op. at 27-28 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 7), rev'd, 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981).
' Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., No. 81-1402 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 7), rev'd, 669 F.2d 366
(6th Cir. 1981).
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violative of section 14(e) of the Williams Act 25 in that it attempted to
"lock-up" the Marathon-U.S. Steel agreement through the prevention
of competitive bidding for Marathon shares. 26 Mobil further alleged
that Marathon's directors failed to meet the disclosure requirements of
section 14(e).2 7 Finally, Mobil attacked the agreement under Ohio
state law claiming a breach of fiduciary duty on the part of Marathon's directors, a lack of proper corporate purpose, and failure to
obtain shareholder approval for a sale of all or substantially all corpo28
rate assets.

Judge Joseph Kinneary granted Mobil an order temporarily restraining Marathon and U.S. Steel from pursuing the latter's tender
offer and from exercising the options pending consideration of Mobil's
claim. 2 The following day Mobil made a new tender offer for the
purchase of thirty million Marathon shares at $126 per share. This
offer was conditioned upon the court's invalidation of the purchase
30
options, although Mobil reserved the right to waive this condition.
In determining the propriety of granting Mobil's request for a
preliminary injunction, Judge Kinneary considered the four factors set

forth by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Mason County
Medical Association v. Knebel.3 1 The four factors analyzed were:
(1) the showing of a substantial likelihood of success by the plaintiff
on the merits; (2) a showing by the plaintiff of irreparable injury in
the absence of an injunction; (3) a determination that substantial
21 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976). The Williams Act was passed in 1968 as an amendment to the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Its sole concern is tender offers which were previously "outside
the scope of federal securities laws." Note, Cash Tender Offers: Judicial Interpretationof Section
14(e), 23 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 262, 262 (1974). Section 14(e) is the antifraud provision of the Act
and provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a material fact
or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading, or to
engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in connection
with any tender offer or request or invitation for tenders, or any solicitation of
security holders in opposition to or in favor of any such offer, request or invitation.
The [Securities Exchange] Commission shall, for the purposes of this subsection, by
rules and regulations define, and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent,
such acts and practices as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative.
15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976).
"8Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., No. 18-1402, slip op. at 2 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 7), rev'd,
669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981).
27 Id. at 3.
2 Id. at 3-4. Mobil's claim at failure to obtain shareholder approval is based on its belief that
the Yates Oilfield, for which Marathon granted U.S. Steel a purchase option, constitutes substantially all of Marathon's assets. Id. at 3.
29Id. at 31.
30 Id.

3563 F.2d 256, 261 (6th Cir. 1977).
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harm would not result to others should an injunction issue; and (4) a
determination that a furthering of the public interest would result
from the issuance of a preliminary injunction. 32 Judge Kinneary
found potential irreparable injury to Mobil due to the likelihood that
Mobil would lose the Yates Oilfield even if it succeeded in acquiring
Marathon. 33 Similarly, if the preliminary injunction were denied and
Mobil later prevailed on its claims, the formulation of an adequate
remedy would be improbable in the face of a successful MarathonU.S. Steel merger.34 Marathon shareholders would also be harmed in
that if the non-disclosure allegations proved true, they would have
tendered shares without complete information.3 5 In addition, the
district court found no indication that the injunction would result in
substantial harm to others. On the contrary, an injunction would
serve the public interest by 36enforcing compliance with legislation
designed to protect investors.

Nevertheless, the court denied Mobil's application for an injunction because of the company's failure to demonstrate probable success
on the merits of its claim.37 Judge Kinneary found no violation of
section 14(e)'s disclosure requirements 38 and no convincing evidence
that the use of the lock-up would constitute a manipulative act was
put forth. 39 The latter conclusion was based on the determination
that Mobil's allegations constituted a claim of breach of fiduciary duty
which, pursuant to Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green,40 would not
be actionable under the federal securities statute. 4' Additionally,
because Marathon's directors had carefully examined all possible offers and had openly communicated the undesirability of the Mobil
offer to its shareholders, the district court also found that the Mara32

Id.

3 Mobil Corp.

v. Marathon Ol Co., No. 81-1402, slip op. at 32-33 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 7),
rev'd, 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981).
'" Id. at 33.
35 Id.

Id. at 34.
1, Id. at 48.
38 Id. at 39-46.
30 Id. at 46-47.
40 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
41 Id. In Santa Fe, a minority stockholder seeking to set aside a merger between Santa Fe
Industries and a subsidiary brought an action alleging violations of section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976). 430 U.S. at 467. See infra note 60 for the text of the
statute. Specifically, Green charged that the corporation's stock had been deliberately underap.
praised in an attempt to force minority shareholders to sell their stock at an inadequate price. Id.
The Supreme Court interpreted section 10(b) as applying to conduct that was manipulative and
deceptive but found that the Santa Fe merger was neither. Id. at 473-74. Therefore, the action
36

could not be brought under section 10(b). The Court decided that the allegation was one of
breach of fiduciary duty which is actionable only under state law. Id. at 478-80.
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thon directors acted in good faith and were not in violation of state
42
standards applicable to a breach of fiduciary duty.
Reversing the decision of the district court, the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit found that Mobil had demonstrated a substantial
likelihood of succeeding on the merits of its claim of manipulation
under section 14(e), thus meeting the first Knebel factor for injunctive
3

relief.1

Because Mobil alleged violations of section 14(e) of the Williams
Act, 44 the court of appeals found it necessary to first determine
whether Mobil, as a tender offeror, had standing to bring a private
cause of action for injunctive relief under the statute. 4 Although the
Supreme Court in Piper v. Chris Craft, Inc., 46 held that a defeated
tender offeror could not bring an action for damages against the target
company and the successful tender offeror, it left open the question
of
47
whether standing would exist in a suit for injunctive relief.
Following Piper, the court of appeals determined that the four
factor analysis set forth by the Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash 48 was
relevant to the determination of whether a private cause of action

1'

Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., No. 18-1402, slip op. at 53-57 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 7), 669
F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981). The court also decided that the sale of the Yates Oilfield did not
constitute substantially all of Marathon's assets, id. at 52, and that Marathon's directors had the
power to authorize the lock-up. Id. at 53.
11 669 F.2d at 375.
41 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
11 669 F.2d at 370. The court rejected Mobil's contention that it had brought this action as a
Marathon shareholder by virtue of prior stock purchases, since, as a tender offeror, Mobil did not
have the ordinary shareholder interest in raising the value of Marathon's shares. As a tender
offeror, Mobil's interest was in keeping the value low, thus making its acquisition of Marathon
less costly. Id.
430 U.S. 1 (1977).
The issue of standing for both a target company and a tender offeror seeking injunctive
relief under the Williams Act has been addressed by a number of courts with varying results. See
Weeks Dredging & Contracting, Inc. v. American Dredging Co., 451 F. Supp. 464 (E.D. Pa.
1978) (granting tender offeror standing to sue for injunctive relief under Williams Act); Humana, Inc. v. American Medicorp., 445 F. Supp. 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (granting tender offeror
standing to sue for injunctive relief under Williams Act); see also Dan River, Inc. v. Unitex Ltd.,
624 F.2d 1216 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1101 (1981) (granting target company
standing to sue for injunctive relief); Kirsch Co. v. Bliss & Laughlin Indus., Inc., 495 F. Supp.
488 (W.D. Mich. 1980) (granting target company standing to sue for injunctive relief). But see
Cateway Indus., Inc. v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., 495 F. Supp. 92 (N.D. II. 1980) (standing
denied to target company); Sta-Rite Indus., Inc. v. Nortek, Inc., 494 F. Supp. 358 (E.D. Wis.
1980) (standing denied to target company). See generally Note, Preliminary Injunctive Relief
and Tender Offers: An Analysis Under the Williams Act, 49 GCo. WASH. L. REv. 563 (1981).
48 422 U.S. 66 (1975). In Cort v. Ash, the Supreme Court denied the existence of a federal
private cause of action for damages against corporate directors who made political contributions
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1976), limiting the plaintiff to remedies under state law. 422
U.S. at 84-85.
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existed under a particular statute. 49 These factors are: (1) whether
the plaintiff is "one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute
was enacted;" (2) whether there was "any indication of legislative
intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny
one;"(3) whether granting the private remedy is "consistent with the
underlying purposes of the legislative scheme;" and (4) whether the
cause of action in question is "one traditionally relegated to state law,
in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be
inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal
law."' 49 Applying the Cort factors, the court of appeals in Mobil
decided that Congress intended the Williams Act to provide a tender
offeror with a cause of action for injunctive relief.
Evaluating Mobil's request under the Cort analysis, the court
noted that a defeated tender offeror did not appear to be of the class
which the legislature intended to benefit by the Williams Act. 50 The
legislation was enacted to protect the shareholders of the target company by ensuring that the decision to tender shares to the offeror is
based upon complete freedom and information.-5 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, however, reasoned that a tender offeror,
due to the nature of a tender offer situation, is in the best position to
protect the target shareholders. Because the tender offeror makes a
thorough investigation of both the target company and the overall
industry prior to making its offer, it is the party best able to provide
the target shareholders with the necessary information in the short
period of time before the acceptance or rejection of the tender offer. 52 According to the court, affording the tender offeror standing to
seek injunctive relief would benefit the target company's shareholders
who are the intended beneficiaries of the Williams Act.
As to the second Cort factor, the Mobil court suggested that a
private action for injunctive relief was implicitly intended by the
legislature because it would further the purpose of the Williams Act to
afford protection to the target's shareholders without favoring one
tender offeror over another. 53 This resulting protection of the target
company's shareholders made the granting of injunctive relief to a

422 U.S. at 78 (emphasis in original and citations omitted).
-' 669 F.2d at 371. The PiperCourt stated that the legislative history of section 14(e) of the
Williams Act shows that its sole purpose was the protection of investors who are confronted with
a tender offer. Tender offerors were the class to be regulated by the statute, not the intended
beneficiaries of the statute. 430 U.S. at 35.
5' 669 F.2d at 371.
'2 Id.
s3 Id. at 371-72.
49
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tender offeror consistent with the underlying purpose of the statute.
Thus, the third Cort factor was also satisfied. 54
Addressing the final Cort factor of whether the cause of action
should be relegated to state law, the court of appeals concluded that
the available state remedy provided an inadequate substitute for the
relief afforded by section 14(e). Rejecting the suggestion of the district
court that Mobil could bring an action for breach of fiduciary duty
under state law, the court noted that such a cause of action would
permit violations of the federal securities laws to be justified merely
upon a showing of good faith. 5 Since all the Cort requirements had
been met, the court concluded that Mobil, as a tender offeror, had an
implied cause of action for injunctive relief pursuant to section 14(e)
of the Williams Act. 58
The court of appeals next addressed the merits of Mobil's request
for an injunction. Returning to the district court's analysis according
to the test set forth in Knebe, 5 7 the court of appeals overturned the
lower court's holding that Mobil failed to show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits.58 The court of appeals' finding of a
substantial likelihood of success was based on the decision that the
Yates Oilfield option and the stock option in the Marathon-U.S. Steel
agreement constituted manipulative devices prohibited by section
14(e).59

Noting that neither the Williams Act nor the Securities Exchange
Act in general defines the term "manipulation," the court adopted the
definition propounded by the Supreme Court in Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder.60 The Supreme Court described manipulation as "inten', Id. at 372.

SId.
'ld.

See supra text accompanying notes 31-37.
669 F.2d at 375.
Id.
6 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976). Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder concerned alleged manipulation in
violation of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act which provides:
'T

It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange.. . (b) To use or employ, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any
security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the [Securities Exchange] Commission
may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection
of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976). Because of the similarity of purposes and prohibitions of section 10(b)
and section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act, a ruling concerning one generally applies to the
other as well. Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 282 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
50 U.S.L.W. 3448 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1981) (No. 81-666); Altman v. Knight, 431 F. Supp. 309, 314
(S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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tional or willful conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors by
controlling or artificially affecting the price of securities."' 6 Applying this definition to an evaluation of the potential effects of the
granting of the Yates Oilfield option and the stock option, the Mobil
court found that the options, operating both individually and jointly,
were manipulative devices.6 2 The court of appeals concluded that
granting U.S. Steel options to purchase a large block of stock and a
major asset to be exercised only in the event that a third party succeed
in the acquisition of Marathon was indicative of an intent to prevent
competitive bidding for Marathon shares. 63 Due to the existence of
the options, the court reasoned that the unlikelihood of an offer higher
than the $125 per share offered by U.S. Steel served to establish that
figure as a ceiling on the valuation of Marathon shares. 4 Because the
lock-up agreement with U.S. Steel represented an attempt to artificially affect the price of Marathon stock, the court concluded that the
options constituted a manipulative device.65 For this reason, the
court allowed the continuation of U.S. Steel's tender offer minus "the
inhibiting and unlawful impact of the two options," 66 and extended
the period of time the offer was to remain open to allow interested
67
companies to make competing bids.
Although the court disclaimed an intention to create a rule for all
options which might be considered lock-ups or which might prevent
competitive bidding,68 its decision could substantially affect the use of
lock-ups both in defeating an unwanted tender offer and in ensuring
the completion of a negotiated merger. 69 Because the decision involved a finding of illegality, its effect on the use of lock-ups is likely to
be negative. A company will be reluctant to avail itself of the technique, if only to avoid the litigation which is likely in the wake of

GI 425 U.S. at 199. The term "artificial" has been construed to mean "'unrelated to the
natural forces of supply and demand." 669 F.2d at 374.
68 669 F.2d at 376.

63 Id. at 374.
4 Id. at 375.
65 Id.
8 Id. at 377.
87 id.
w Id.
The potential impact of the decision was recognized by Mobil. They stated:
The issue of legality thus comes before this Court-the first Court of Appeals to
consider it-as one of landmark significance, in a case followed closely by the
business and financial world which is certain to have immediate and far-reaching
impact upon the future form and substance of corporate mergers and acquisitions.
Brief for Appellant, supra note 18, at 14.
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Mobil's success. 70 This probable result is unfortunate because it will
deprive corporate directors of a valuable tool in defeating an undesirable tender offer.

Despite the argument by some that corporate directors should not
be permitted to oppose tender offers, 7 ' the courts have clearly established that directors have a duty to fight an offer which, after careful
consideration, they deem to be against the best interests of the corporation's shareholders. 72 This duty is not without restrictions, however, as directors are required to be fair and impartial in making
decisions and to act pursuant to the general fiduciary duties imposed
upon them. That is, they must be motivated by a desire to further the
interests of the shareholders rather than by self-interest. 73 Corporate
directors have been greatly frustrated in their efforts to fulfill this
duty. In the majority of contested takeovers the bidder acquires the
target despite the target management's use of various defensive techniques. 74 The lock-up is intended to increase the probability that the
use of one defensive technique-the merger with a white knight-will
be successful. Thus, it would aid directors in fulfilling a judicially
imposed obligation. An attempt to arrange a merger with a white
70 One Wall Street attorney's opinion of the impact of the Mobil decision on the future use of
the lock-up is: '"
It won't necessarily be a good idea' for a target company to enter into a lock-up
agreement of any kind during a tender, 'because that will clearly lead to litigation, which could
cause a significant delay.' " Blustein & Rotbart, supra note 3, at 23, col. 6.
71 Easterbrook & Fischel, The ProperRole of a Target's Management in Responding to a
Tender Offer, 94 HAsv. L. REv. 1161 (1981). Professors Easterbrook and Fischel argue that
managements resistance to a tender offer is detrimental to shareholder welfare. Such resistance
drains corporate resources, and deprives shareholders of a premium over the market price of
their shares. Even when resistance results in shareholders receiving a higher premium, as in a
white knight merger, the effect is to decrease the overall number of tender offers made. This
deprives all shareholders of the tender offer's effect of moving productive assets to the hands of
better management (assuming that tender offerors seek companies which suffer from poor
management). Id. Contra Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAw. 101
(1979); Steinbrink, Management'sResponse to the Takeover Attempt, 28 CASE W. L. REv. 107

(1980).
72 See Panter v. Marshall Field Co., 646 F.2d 271, 288 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 50
U.S.L.W. 3448 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1981) (No. 81-666); Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357,
381 (2d Cir. 1980); Heit v. Baird, 567 F.2d 1157, 1161 (1st Cir. 1977); Northwest Indus., Inc. v.
B.F. Goodrich, 301 F. Supp. 706, 712-13 (N.D. IU. 1969).
73 Northwest Indus., Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich, 301 F. Supp. 706, 712-13 (N.D. III. 1969).
71 A survey of tender offer activity during 1978 and early 1979 indicates that the tender
offeror generally succeeds in obtaining its target despite the target management's use of defensive
techniques. In 1978, tender offerors succeeded in 55% of contested offers. In the first six months
of 1979, 60% of contested offers were completed. Austin, Tender Offers Update: 1978-1979, 15
MEtcEas & AcQosrMoNs 13, 18-19 (Summer 1980). A survey taken a year later showed an
increase in the trend. In 1980, 47 tender offers were contested but only one target's management
was successful in defending against the unwanted takeover. Austin & Mandula, Tender Offer
Trend in the 1980's, 16 MmEcms & AcQulsmoNs 46, 46 (Fall 1981).
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knight using a lock-up for reasons other than the protection of the
target shareholders would be actionable under state law as a breach of

75
fiduciary duty.

Although other defensive techniques are available, 7 they result
in the target company remaining independent. In a white knight
merger, however, the shareholders are permitted an opportunity to
sell their shares at a premium over the market price. 77 This premium
is, almost without exception, greater than that offered by the defeated
tender offeror. 78 Consequently, by ensuring the success of the white

knight merger, the lock-up acts to further the interests of the shareholders. A discussion of the value of a lock-up agreement must also
consider the fact that it is a product of recent economic conditions
which have increased the financial risk associated with making a
competitive bid for a target company. As mentioned above, 79 it is only
by the inclusion of a lock-up agreement that many firms will agree to
assume the risk and act as a white knight, thereby allowing target
management to defeat an unwanted takeover and providing target
shareholders with the opportunity to sell their shares at a higher
premium.
The potential chilling effect of the Mobil decision on the use of a
lock-up can be avoided if courts apply a standard of interpretation for
section 14(e) violations which provides for a weighing of the benefits
provided by the lock-ups and management's desire to assure its shareholders of those benefits against the potential harm. 0 Courts have
applied different standards in determining section 14(e) violations
including the "valid business purpose" test, and the "primary purpose" test often employed in evaluating claims of breach of fiduciary

7S Generally, state corporate law places corporate directors in the position of a fiduciary with
respect to the corporation and the corporation's shareholders and imposes a duty of "honesty,
loyalty, good faith, diligence and fairness." Panter v.Marshall Field & Co., 486 F. Supp. 1168,
1192 (N.D. III. 1980), ajy'd, 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3448 (U.S.

Oct. 5, 1981) (No. 81-666).
78 Other defensive techniques include changing corporate by-laws to require a supermajority
of shareholder votes for merger approval; issuing additional corporate shares to impair the
offeror's ability to obtain a controlling interest; instituting litigation against the tender offeror;
declaring dividends to increase the price of the target company's shares; and, urging target
shareholders not to tender. Fischel, Efficient CapitalMarket Theory, the Market for Corporate
Control, and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 TExAs L. REv. 1, 30-39 (1978).
' Fischel, supra note 76, at 39. White knight mergers "are unique among defensive tactics

because they create an auction between the offeror and other companies interested in merging
with the target to the ultimate advantage of all shareholders." Id.
78 Comment, supra note 3, at 629.
79 See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
80 See infra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
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duty. 8' The court of appeals in Mobil, however, did not use a clearly
defined standard. Instead it noted that the underlying purpose of the
Williams Act was to protect "the free, informed choice of shareholders" in a tender offer situation.8 2

The court then assumed that such

freedom of choice required that all potential tender offerors be able to
compete on an equal basis for the target shares.8" Because the lock-up
favored one particular tender offeror, it precluded other potential
offerors from making competing bids, thus acting to the detriment of
Marathon shareholders whose choice was then limited to the U.S.
Steel offer. 84 In addition, the court of appeals reasoned that the lockup options "could be construed as expressly designed solely" for the
purpose of blocking "healthy market activity." ' s
The standard used by the court of appeals in Mobil is inadequate
for determining the validity of a lock-up, or any action allegedly
violative of section 14(e), for two reasons. First, it misconstrues the
fundamental purpose of the Williams Act which is:
[T]o provide the investor, the person who is required to rmake a
decision, an opportunity to examine and to assess the relevant facts
and to reach a decision without being pressured and without being
subject to unwarranted techniques which are designed to prevent
that from happening.88
Thus, the Williams Act seeks to protect shareholder decision-making
with respect to offers with which they are actually faced. Although
the possibility of competitive bids is a factor to be considered in
determining the attractiveness of an existing offer, a free and informed decision could be made without requiring, as the Mobil court
did, that all possible tender offerors operate on an equal basis. The
" The "valid business purpose" test requires that corporate directors have some valid business reason for their action. See Applied Digital Data Sys., Inc. v. Milgo Electronic Corp., 425
F. Supp. 1145, 1158 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (applied "valid business purpose" test to alleged Williams
Act violations).
The "primary purpose" test requires that the controlling purpose of a director's actions be a
valid corporate purpose. Thus, it is a stricter test than the above. See Klaus v. Hi-Shear Corp.,
528 F.2d 225, 234 (9th Cir. 1975) (upheld application of "primary purpose" test to Williams Act
claim).
11 669 F.2d at 371.

81 Id. at 376.
84

Id.
IId. at 374.

" Full Disclosureof CorporateEquity Ownership and in CorporateTakeover Bids: Hearings
on S.510 Before the Senate Subcomm. on Securities of the Comm. on Banking and Currency,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1967) (statement of Manuel F. Cohen, Chairman, Securities Exchange
Commission) cited in Lynch & Steinberg, The Legitimacy of Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers,
64 CORNELL L. Rsv. 901, 912 (1979).
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approach adopted in the Sixth Circuit also frustrates the express intent
of Congress to structure the Williams Act in a way that favors neither
87
the tender offeror nor the target's management.
Second, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit inferred an
intent on the part of the directors to defraud the shareholders. This
inference was drawn without an examination of all the facts relevant
to the Marathon director's decision to grant U.S. Steel the lock-up
options. The detrimental effect of this inference becomes apparent
when the result in Mobil is compared to the possible result of using a
standard in which management's decision is more fully examined.88
Such a standard has been proposed. It would allow courts to
weigh the target directors' actions in attempting to use a lock-up for
the benefit of their shareholders while preventing the denial of the
protection afforded the shareholders under section 14(e).89 This
standard involves a two-step process which begins with a determination of whether the device employed materially impeded the target
shareholder's consideration of existing offers. Devices which do not
hinder shareholder decision-making are not violative of section
14(e). 90 If a device is found to have such an effect, however, the
presumption arises that target management intended to prevent shareholders from considering an existing offer or offers. 9 ' Management,
however, may rebut the presumption and thereby preclude a finding
of section 14(e) liability by producing evidence to show that the
primary purpose was not to inhibit shareholder decision-making. 92
Thus, this standard applies the primary purpose test previously used
in section 14(e) decisions but only after a violation had been foundnot to determine the existence of such a violation.
It is the latter introduction of the primary purpose test which
would have produced a more favorable decision with respect to the
9 3
use of the lock-up device in the Marathon-U.S. Steel argument.
There is considerable evidence indicating that the major aim of Marathon's directors was not to impede shareholder decision-making but to
enhance it. At the board meeting called the day following Mobil's

87 H.K. Porter Co. v. Nicholson File Co., 482 F.2d 421, 423 (1st Cir. 1973).
" See infra notes 93-98 and accompanying text.
89 Lynch & Steinberg, supra note 86, at 924-28.
90 Id. at 927.
91 Id. at 927-28.
92 Id. at 928.
11 Although the discussion concerns application of the proposed standard to lock-ups, this

standard would, as its creators suggest, be applicable to all tender offer defensive techniques as
well as to all devices which are subject to scrutiny under the Williams Act. Id. at 912.
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initial offer, the directors were reminded by counsel that their first
responsibility was to Marathon's shareholders. 9 4 During that meeting
the directors concluded, based on advice of counsel concerning possible antitrust complications and recommendations of investment advisers concerning the adequacy of the price offered, that Mobil's offer
was inadequate.9 5 Marathon then sought a tender offeror who would
provide the shareholders with a fair price for their stock."" All three
major white knight candidates, U.S. Steel included, insisted upon
some form of lock-up as a condition to a tender offer for Marathon
shares.9 7 Hence, Marathon's directors were required to use a lock-up
to ensure a fair price for their shareholders. The above was sufficient
for the district court to find the existence of a proper corporate purpose.9 8 It is likely, therefore, that it would have been sufficient to
rebut a presumption that the Marathon directors' primary purpose
was to impede the shareholders' decision to tender shares.
Examining a lock-up in terms of the purpose of the Williams Act
and in terms of target management's purpose in utilizing the technique provides the balancing necessary for the continued use of the
technique. The approach taken by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit involves a broadened interpretation of the purpose of the Act
and fails to consider all factors relevant to management's intent. It
resulted in a decision which invalidates the use of the lock-up in
question and discourages future use of the technique. Such a result
deprives management of an effective tool for implementing decisions
which further the interests of the shareholders. The suggested standard, however, allows target management to advance the interests of
shareholders without diluting the protection given the shareholders
pursuant to the Williams Act. As such, it provides the best approach
to evaluating a lock-up as well as other devices allegedly in violation
of section 14(e).
BarbaraA. Koza
Although this note focuses upon the actions of Marathon's directors, its propositions also
apply to U.S. Steel's directors whose actions in requesting the lockup could also give rise to a
section 14(e) violation.
"' Brief for Appellee, supra note 15, at 6.
9s Id. at 6-8.
Id. at 7.
' See supra note 18.
*a Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., No. 81-1405, slip op. at 44 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 7), rev'd,
669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981).

